Since the late 1950s, there have been several attempts at economic integration in Latin America and the Caribbean. Until the 1990s, the results achieved by all these previous efforts were disappointing and fell short of the lofty goals initially laid out for them. The economic integration projects, which were revived or have appeared since the 1990s, have been much more successful in terms of fomenting significant increases in intra-regional trade. One important explanation for this phenomenon has been the market-oriented economic policies that were adopted in one degree or another in each of the Latin American countries that better complimented the overall goals sought through economic integration. Before the 1990s, the rhetorical goal of bigger markets and the corresponding economies of scale often collided with protectionist trade policies being pursued at the national level. Before examining the exact reasons why past attempts at economic integration in Latin America and the Caribbean stagnated or collapsed, it is important to define exactly what is meant by the term economic integration.
Economic integration projects have traditionally been divided into one of five categories.
1 The first and least complicated form of economic integration is a free trade area. In a free trade area, tariffs and quantitative restrictions are eliminated on goods traded among the member states. Each participating country, however, retains its own individual external tariff structure as against non-member states. The second form is a customs union and consists of a free trade area coupled with a common external tariff (CET) that is applied by all the member states on imports from outside the union. The third form of integration, a common market, includes all the features of a customs union but adds the free movement of factors of production (i.e., labor and capital) between the member states. An economic union, the fourth form of integration, combines a common market with some degree of harmonization of each member state's macroeconomic policies. It has been argued that, for a common market to be truly successful, it must be an economic union. This view eventually prevailed in Europe, when the European Economic Community (EEC)-a common market-became the European Union (EU) in 1992 following the creation of the European Central Bank and eventually the establishment of a single currency. Finally, total economic integration, the fifth form, involves the unification of monetary, fiscal, and social policies, and the establishment of a supranational authority whose decisions are binding on all the member states. Total economic integration is synonymous with the creation of a federal entity such Brazil, Canada, or the United States of America.
Under traditional economic integration theory, the justification for joining a customs union or common market depended upon whether the union would lead to the creation of new trade flows or whether it would simply divert trade flows to inefficient producers within the newly established bloc.
2 A union that increased overall trade was considered the ideal, if the most efficient producer in the international arena became the chief supplier of the new customs union or common market. Trade creation was said to be more likely to occur in a proposed economic bloc where the member states had previously traded heavily among themselves and where trade had been competitive but potentially complementary.
3
Developing countries generally conduct very little trade among themselves, and they are usually not very industrialized. Under traditional economic integration theory, it was thought that a customs union or common market was unlikely to be successful under such circumstances. For example, the imposition of high tariff walls around a union of developing countries would only divert trade away from more efficient producers in the developed world to inefficient producers operating within the new bloc. Despite this, a group of economists from the now discredited import-substitution or dependista school of economics argued that while a customs union or common market among developing countries might initially result in trade diversion, the larger market created would provide economies of scale and decrease production costs, encouraging industrial growth. 4 Over the long run, this new industrial growth would contribute to a modern and diverse productive structure. Among the major proponents of this line of thought were economists associated with the UN Economic Commission for Latin America based in Santiago, Chile. Implicit in the dependista perspective was the understanding that the high CET used to protect the nascent industrial sector would be temporary in nature until the new industries had gained sufficient strength in order to effectively compete on the international market. Unfortunately, this assumption was never put into practice. Accordingly, whatever positive gains might have initially been obtained from the initial high tariff barriers dissipated as they were retained indefinitely. Not only did this long-term protectionism encourage high inefficiency, low productivity, and technological obsolescence, it also contributed to a heavy foreign debt burden as money had to be borrowed abroad to finance the importation of capital goods and inputs to sustain many uncompetitive manufacturing activities.
